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Abstract 
1ms paper looks at the long term output effect of those monetary policies aimed at 
reducing inflation from its peak by the late seventies, in nine major OEeD countries. 
The estimated effect depends on the way nominal shocks are identified. Alternatively 
to the cross-country regression analysis we estimate a Structural V AR model in 
output, inflation and unemployment. In this model some asswnptions turn out to be 
of crucial importance: inflation is primarily, though not exclusively, a monetary 
phenomenon and neither pennanent inflation nor the natural rate of unemployment 
are affected by productivity shocks. Under this identification scheme we find that 
pennanent disinflations achieved by means of pennanent reductions in money growth 
display a short-run Phillips curve pattern, but take most economies in our sample 
onto a higher level of steady state output. 
Keywords: Disinflation, monetary shocks, stuctural V AR. 
JEL classification: E31, E58, 04. 

1. INTRODUCTION 
After years of price stability in the industrialized world during most of the 
postwar era, by the early seventies inflation rates were on the rise. The 
mismanagement of monetary policies, due to an imperfect understanding of the 
mechanics of inflation (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1997) and the lose of confidence 
on the institutions of the international monetary system were at the root of these 
mnderate inflationary episodes. After the first oil shock the monetary authorities did 
not react with tight monetary policies and things went from bad to worse: inflation 
rates reached by the late seventies historical levels while output growth rates feU and 
unemployment started to rise. In the last two decades. economic authorities all over 
the industrialized world have encouraged a major change in the way monetary 
policies are conducted and price stability has become the main aim of mndem central 
banking. This process is by no means costless since a finn commitment to low and 
stable inflation reduces the room of manoeuvre of central banks to hinder the effect 
of some temporary shocks on unemployment. The conventional wisdom among 
monetary policy makers is that reducing inflation may generate a recession in the 
short run, but it pays-off in terms of higher output over the long run. 
Sound monetary policies have been the key to reduce inflation to its current 
level. That the disinflation might be, to some extent, responsible for the currently 
high level of unemployment in some countries can hardly be denied either. The 
question is whether the monetary policies followed during the nineties can also claim 
responsibility for higher output today. If they can, such monetary strategy can be 
considered successful, both on nominal and real grounds, at least from the 
perspective of agents with mnderate discount rates. Otherwise, it would be difficult 
to justify tight moneta,y strategies as welfare improving policies. 
The aim of this paper is to provide an answer for this question focusing on 
the disinflationary experience of nine countries (C9 thereafter): United States, 
Canada, Japan, Italy, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Australia and Spain. Since 
our aim is to focus in the recent disinflation experience the sample period is 1972:2-
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1996:3(1); this is also the longest period for which homogeneous unemployment, 
GOP and inflation series are available for this group of countries. The task of 
encompassing, within a unified theoretical framework, the channels through which 
monetary policy operates in the short run and in the long run is beyond the scope of 
this paper and thus our approach is mostly empirical(2)' Our aim is to identify the 
nominal or monetary sources of permanent inflation and then look at how these 
affect output in the long run. This has been attempted by Bullard and Keating 
( 1995), but our identification scheme differs from theirs as for the long-run 
determinants of inflation. We find that unemployment dynamics plays a crucial role 
as to separate out the nominal and real sources of inflation and output. To that end, 
we follow Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Shapiro and Watson ( 1988) and identify 
these shocks by imposing some long-run restrictions in a small structural vector 
autoregressive model (SV AR) including inflation, output and unemployment. This 
identification scheme is discussed in section 2, within the framework of a simple 
model. In section 3 we estimate the long-run effect on output and unemployment of 
a permanent nominal disinflation and provide an interpretation of the results. Section 
4 concludes with some additional remarks. 
2. IDENTIFYING THE LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF INFLATION: A SVAR 
APPROACH 
2.1. The basic model 
In the context of models of economic growth, even anticipated inflation may 
reduce the rate of return of capital because of the non-neutralities built-in most 
(I) On the grounds of homogeneous data availability, we use data of West 
Germany ( 1972:2-1994:4) instead of Germany, and the sample period is also 
different for Spain and Italy (1976:3-1996:3 and 1972:2-1995:3, respectively). 
(2) Actually, as recently stated by Solow (1997): "One major weakness in the core 
of macroeconomics ... is the lack of real coupling between the short-run picture and 
the long-run picture". 
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industrialized countries tax systems (Jones and Manuelli (1995), Feldstein (1997)) 
or because the way bank regulations interact with monetary policies (Chari, Jones 
and Manuelli (1995))0>. This is known as the accumulation or investment effect of 
inflation on growth. But inflation may also reduce the efficiency with which 
productive factors are used (efficiency effect). A high level of inflation induces 
frequent changes in prices which may be costly for firms (menu costs) and reduces 
the optimal level of cash-holdings by consumers (shoe-leather costs). It also leads 
to bigger forecast errors thus encouraging economic agents to spend more time and 
resources in gathering infonnation. endangering the efficient allocation of resources. 
The empirical relevance of these effects bas been tested within the framework 
of cross-country convergence regressions augmented by the inflation rate. In his 
pioneering work, Barro (1995) estimates a negative long-run correlation between 
inflation and growth, using a large sample of countries. Although the author shows 
that this correlation survives when the prior colonial status of each country is used 
as instrument, still many authors claim that since both inflation and output are 
endogenous variables their correlation might be simply reflecting the incidence of 
non-monetary shocks, for instance technology shocks, affecting both variables in an 
opposite manner'''. Barro (1996) and Gylfasson and Herbertsson (1996) find that 
controlling for random effects in cross-country regressions does not significantly alter 
the dynamic relationship among these two variables. Andres and Hernando (1997) 
narrow their analysis to the OECD sample carefully looking at the issue of 
endogeneity in a number of ways(S). They conclude that inflation causes income in 
the Granger sense and also that the negative correlation is robust to a number of 
(3) See, for instance, Orpbanides and Solow (1990) and De Gregorio (1993). 
(" See Kocherlakota (1996) and Sims (1996), among others. 
(S) These authors also show that the estimated negative correlation among 
inflation and output is not explained by the presence of high inflation countries in 
the sample. 
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changes in the sample and of improvements in the econometric specification such 
as the possibility of idiosyncratic fixed effects(6). 
No matter how elaborated they might be, cross-country convergence 
regressions do not fully settle the issue of endogeneity in the correlation among 
inflation and growth. This issue is of crucial importance to assess the beneficial 
effects of sound monetary policies. The argument goes as follows. Let us assume 
that output and inflation are non stationary variables whose unit roots can be 
explained by J orthogonal shocks {& j J , 
"t = ,,[b,(L)e', b,(L)e', b,(L)e', . . . .  J 
Yt = y[d,(L)e', d,(L)e', d,(L)e', . . . .  J 
If &' represents money growth, the estimated long-run correlation among inflation 
and income is relevant for the monetary authority if, 
Corr (" (b, (1) e'), y(d, (1) e')) < 0 
which, in tum, requires as a necessary condition that, 
d, (1) e' • 0 
where b(J) and d(l) represent the long-run multipliers of d(L) and b(L) respectively. 
Alternatively, the critics' argument goes, the negative correlation estimated in 
convergence equations might be driven by other(s) non-monetary shock(s) &j, 
Corr(" (bj(l)ej), y(dj(l)eJ)) < 0 
Thus the right way to proceed is to estimate the ultimate source of 
fluctuations (&' s) and to test the sign of d,(l). Since &' is exogenous, the issue 
of causality is adequately handled. 
(6) These effects might be correlated with the regressors and are approximated by 
means of country-specific constants. 
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Bullard and Keating (1995) were among the first to approach the long-run 
effect of inflation in this way. They assume that the J set can be split in two groups: 
those shocks which exert a pennanent effect on inflation (eP) and those with a 
purely temporary effect on it (e T) . Thus, the long-run representation of the {".y} 
process is: 
Ant Yll{l)e� 
Bullard and Keating invoke the extreme monetarist assumption of that inj/ation is 
a/ways and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. Under this assumption. E P can be 
identified as the only shock behind the unit root of inflation which must be just the 
rate of growth of the monetary base, without contamination from supply side 
disturbances, to be found in E T. Thus, the intell'retation of the estimated long run 
correlation among inflation and income boils down to a test of the sign of YlI(I). 
Bullard and Keating apply their model to several countries and find that the sign of 
YlI(J) is positive in most cases and significant in some of them, meaning that 
inflation is costless over the long run. If disinflations, as it is broadly accepted, are 
costly in the short-run the case for price stability is undermined. Thus, while cross­
country regressions come up with a negative relationship between inflation and 
output, the SV AR approach, aimed at eliminating supply side influences on inflation, 
yields opposite results. 
This is not the end of the story, though, for the extreme monetarist IIX>del can 
he misspecified. precisely for the same reasons as the conventional cross-country 
regression approach. If the extreme monetarist argument is right, then there would 
be no causality-based case against the convergence regressions results: i.e. 
correlations among thirty years averages of inflation and growth would reflect just 
the common effect of monetary shocks. To see this possible misspecification more 
formally let us assume that the monetarist claim is not true and that permanent 
inflation has a real component instead (E'). Thus, the long-run representation of 
the' process is, 
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Under this assumption it is clear that the estimated e P in the monetarist model 
would not be an adequate estimate of the long run effect of monetary shocks, since 
it would be capturing two different (may be opposite) effects. For this to happen, it 
does not matter how small the contibution of E' to the the long-run fluctuations of 
" is. As long as it is significant, what really matters is the size of d,(J); if this 
multiplier is positive and large, an estimated positive rAJ) might be compatible 
with a negative influence of monetary shocks on output (i.e. a negative d,(J)). 
Unfortunately, the additional source of long-run inflation cannot be handled in the 
bivariate system if we want to make use of long-run identification restrictionsm. 
2.2. Identifying additional sources of fluctuations: The role of unemployment. 
To identify additional sources of fluctuations of !nflation, thus isolating the 
true nominal component, we need to enlarge the model to allow for a third variable. 
The unemployment rate is the natural candidate for that purpose. The enlarged model 
is specified as a three variables stationary vector in the first differences of the 
unemployment rate (II), inflation (n) and the log of output (Y), driven by three 
orthogonal shocks: i' containing the nominal source of fluctuations 
and e Z and e· which are real and, that for reasons explained below, are called 
productivity and natural rate-velocity shocks respectively"'. There are a number of 
advantages in bringing the unemployment rate into the V AR. First, unemployment 
has been during the last two decades very much a non-stationary variable that it is 
'" Notice that if rl1(J) is left fTee, there can be no zeroes impossed in the matrix 
of long-run multipliers since r1l(1) is our main hypothesis of interest. The model 
could be identidfied imposing short-run restrictions. We shall return to this later. 
(I) Unit root tests for the variables are surrunarized in Appendix 1. 
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bound to contain useful infonnation about the long-run features of the economies in 
our sample(9). Secondly, most macroeconomic models come up with clear-cut 
predictions about the long-run determinants of unemployment (i.e. on the NAIRU), 
thus providing structural restrictions for identification purposes. Finally, but not least, 
a joint consideration of output and unemployment seems the natural approach to the 
coslS of inflation since the SV AR approach pennilS a clear distinction among short 
run and long run responses to particular shocks. Disinflation is meant to impinge 
upon the economy some costs and to yield some benefits. The expected time pattern 
of these is one in which costs, in tenns of higher unemployment and output 
foregone, come first whereas the eventual beneficial effects take much longer to 
show up. The presence of such pattern in the dynamics of our model might be taken 
as some sort of infonnal overidentifying restrictions. 
The following simple structure will serve to rationalize our approach as well 
as the identifying strategy: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3 ) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(9) See, for instance, King and Watson (1994), AIogouskofis and Manning (1988) 
and footnote 8 in the recent paper by Hall (1998). 
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(7 ) 
The inflation process is represented in (I) by a simple quantitative theory equation, 
where m and v are logs of money supply and velocity respectively. (2) and (3) are 
structural unrestricted representations of Il. v and Am in terms of the structural 
innovations. Expressions (4) and (5) represent the determinants of current output, 
derived from a constant returns to scale production function, and potential (Y') 
output; a, k and r represent the total factor productivity, the capital stock and the 
labour supply respectively. Equation (6) is a standard supply equation or Phillips 
curve in which deviations of unemployment from its natural level (u) depend on 
temporary nominal and real shocks. Finally, (7) represents the process of u· as a 
function of the e's. 
From (1)-(3) the process of inflation can be written as a function of the 
structural innovations as, 
and taking first differences in (6), 
au, = au; - � [e" (0) (E; - E;-l) + e" (0) (E� - E�_l) 
+ (e" (0) + 1) (E� - E�-l) 1 
(8) 
(9) 
where C'j(O) are the associated short-run multipliers. Similarly, the output process 
(Okun 's Law) can be written as follows: 
ay, = ay:-(l-IX) (au,-au;) (10) 
From (9) we see that the effect of any shock on unemployment is purely transitory, 
unless it affects u· directly. Most theories of the natural rate predict that nominal 
shocks do not have a permanent effect on unemployment. Similarly, according to 
these theories the effect of purely productivity shocks on the supply and the demand 
for labour cancel out in the long run, so that these shocks have no effect upon u· 
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eitherlO). If we identify e Z as those real shocks with no pennanent effect on u·, 
the process (7) incorporates the following long-run restrictions: 0,(1)=0,(1)=0. Thus 
the structural equation of unemployment is of the fonn: 
(11) 
where the long run multipliers c,,(l) and c,,(1) are both set to zero. 
The process of I' is not restricted. According to equation (10) the sources of 
long-run output fluctuations are those of potential output, i.e. those behind pennanent 
changes in the savings rate, population growth and the total factor productivity. 
These variables are jointly driven by all shocks: EN, E Z and E·. Notice that 
both e Z and e' are real determinants of output, the difference among them being 
that the former does not exert a permanent influence upon unemployment. As regards 
the possibility of a nominal shock affecting investment and productivity, this is the 
effect that models of growth and inflation, as the ones mentioned above, are looking 
at. This is the channel through which monetary policies can have an effect beyond 
the medium teon and is the hypothesis we are interested in. Thus, the structural 
output equation contains no long-run restrictions, 
(12) 
The model with the restrictions discussed so far can be put in matrix fonnat 
as, 
"OJ This has been established by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) as a 
consistent empirical feature of modem economies. The relevance of this fact in the 
design of consistent macroeconomic models of unemployment has been recently 
stressed by Blanchard and Katz (1997). 
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[4U 
4" 
4y 
Cl1(l) 0 0 
c,,(l) c,,(l) c,,(l) 
cll (1) cn (1) cn (1) 
(13) 
Equations (I) to (5) above are fairly general and do not impose restrictions, 
but (6) is not. In particular, in economies with hysteresis, the Phillips curve ought 
to be written as follows: 
such that if p would equal I, the unemployment process would be driven on the long 
run by all three shocks of the system, delivering no useful information to identify 
each of them. The evidence suggests that the role of persistence, and thus the history 
of shocks, is crucial in explaining the high structural unemployment in the 
industrialized world. Thus, the superiority of the first difference stationary 
representation for the unemployment rate can hardly be disputed. The fact that 
unemployment has a non-stationary representation has been sometimes considered 
as a sign of filII hysteresi, and hence of a permanent trade-off among inflation and 
unemployment. But this does not have to be the case. A simple model of the labour 
market in Appendix 2 makes clear under what circumstances the unit root of the 
unemp10yment rate might have a nominal component. These conditions are rather 
demanding and, as Blanchard (1997) claims " ... whether ... channels (behind 
hysteresis) can explain large and long-lasting effects of disinflation on IInemployment 
is for ji"Om established". Hence, although the degree of persistence in unemployment 
is very high in most countries, the assumption of full hysteresis is difficult to 
maintain and, thus, we chose to impose (6) on the data. 
The restriction set in (13) helps to separate out {e N, e Z} from e', but does 
not isolate three orthogonal innovations. Neither the output nor the unemployment 
process can be restricted further. The later because there is only one source of 
permanent fluctuations left; the former because the standard model above suggests 
that all three shocks drive output. Thus, the additional restrictions must be found in 
the inflation process, and here is where the monetarist assumption is useful. 
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The asswnption that long-run inflation is only money (i _ e _ 1.., ( 1) = A, ( 1) = 
X, (1) = X, (1) = 0 )  would provide with two additional restrictions so that the 
model would be overidentified: c,/I) =c,,(I) =0. Table I shows that these 
overidentifying restrictions are largely rejected by the data. The reason for that 
rejection is clear: if money is the only source of inflation in the long-run but it does 
not affect unemployment at all, then unemployment and inflation should be long-run 
orthogonal (since eN and e' are so, by construction). What the rejection of the 
overidentifying restrictions indicate is precisely that this is not the case and that in 
all C9 countries the urtit root of inflation and unemployment must have a common 
component(ll). 
One alternative is to stick to the extreme monetarist assumption but allowing 
for a long run effect of money on unemployment (i.e. 15,(1) and c,,(1) non zero). But 
aside from relying in the extreme monetarist assumption, this approach has other 
shortcomings. The correlation among inflation and unemployment would be entirely 
accounted for by eN, meaning that money has not only a permanent but also a 
powerful effect upon unemployment over the long run. Furthermore, if there is full 
hysteresis productivity shocks might also affect unemployment rendering the model 
underidentified. Thus, the only way in which a long-run vertical Phillips curve might 
be imposed on the data, while still giving the correlation among inflation and 
unemployment a chance, requires allowing the possibility of more than one shock 
driving the inflation process in the long run. In such a case, the low frequency 
correlation among inflation and unemployment is due to real shocks(l2). This is 
what we look at next. 
(II) See, for details on that evidence, King and Watson (1994) for the case of US. 
"2) In the case of the US economy, this has been suggested by Evans (1994) in 
a similar setting. 
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2.3. Our identification scheme 
If inflation has to have a second source of long-run fluctuation this must be 
real: since money growth is the only nominal root in the system, it cannot appear in 
more than one exogenous component if these are orthogonal each other. We allow 
for this possiblity by removing the restrictions ",(1)=0 and X, ( 1) = 0 in (2). 
which in tum means that there is only a valid long-run restriction on the inflation 
process, namely c]J(J);O. This makes clear the distinction among E· and E z; the 
later are those real shocks that affect neither unemployment nor velocity in the long 
runO}). In what follows we first discuss some theoretically justifications for this 
assumption and then we shall discuss its empirical relevance. 
Pennanent differences in money growth account for most of the cross-country 
differences in permanent inflation; still. many authors argue that a. probably small 
but significant, influence of non-monetary factors cannot be denied. In particular, the 
literature of international trade suggests that relative inflation is partially explained 
by structural differences both on the demand and on the supply side of the 
economy(\4). The argument relies in the different pricing behaviour of finns in 
sectors exposed to the international competition as compared with that of firms 
specialized in the production of non-tradeable goods. Productivity growth in the 
tradeables sector leads to higher wages which spreads into other sectors in an 
economy with a unified labour market. Higher wage pressure in sectors with 
monopolistic power (non-tradeable goods) is translated into higher prices unless it 
is matched by a vigorous productivity growth. Thus. productivity growth differentials 
may result in permanent inflation. Similar effects can result from increases in public 
spending (Rogoff, 1992). Ball and Mankiw (1995) also show that menu costs may 
induce price level effetcs of real shocks if the distribution of relative prices presents 
,(3) The identification of these two separate real roots of the system may not be 
very precise. However, it helps to isolate the nominal innovation and this is what we 
are interested in. 
'''> See. among others, Balassa (1964). Samuelson (1964) or, more recently. De 
Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994) and Campillo and Miron (1997). 
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skewness. What these real theories of inflation have in common is that shocks which 
do not have a monetary origin might exert a lasting influence on the inflation rate, 
but they are not always explicit about the role played by monetary growth in the 
actual inflation processll�). 
From an empirical point of view there are a number of reasons to allow for 
more than one source of long-run inflation movements. First, from an econometric 
perspective, the time horizon at which money can be considered fully 
accommodated, and thus the only source of inflation, may be very long. If this is the 
case, extreme monetarism is an infinite horizon property and it may not be wise to 
impose it as a long run restriction at finite horizons('6). Second, removing one 
restriction in the inflation process allows for a proper test on the adequacy of such 
restriction. Third, recall that orthogonality ensures that only one of the shocks behind 
inflation contains the nominal component, the one whose effect we are interested in. 
If this shock is properly identified, its effect on output can be analyzed regardless 
of our ability to give a precise interpretation to the rest of the shocks in the model. 
Thus, our identification scheme (non-extreme-monetarist non-!ilil-hysteresis) 
allows for two sources of long-run inflation dynamics (E N and E·), and the 
matrix of the long-run multipliers looks as follows"": 
CIS, One exception is Balke and Wynne (1996) that show how inflation may OCCur 
even without money growth, merely as a consequence of real shocks. Other 
economists would argue that persistent inflation always requires monetary 
accommodation (Ball, 1993). 
Cl., See Faust and Leeper (1994). 
{l" Appendix 3 summarizes the results obtained under non monetarist 
identification schemes relying upon restrictions on the short run coefficients, elL}. 
Whereas short-run restrictions are less appealing than the long-run ones, these results 
confinn those obtained imposing (14). 
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3. Results 
[dU 
d1t 
dy 
Cll (1) o o 
C2l (1) c" (1) 0 
c,,(l) C,,(l) c,,(l) 
(14) 
The SVAR model under the set of restrictions summarized in the system (14) 
is estimated for our sample of nine countries. Figures 1-3 depict the response 
functions, for each country, of unemployment, output and inflation to each of the 
three shocks; the one year and the long-run forecast error variance decompositions 
are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. Although our primary aim is the identification of 
the nominal shock (E N). a first glance to Figures I and 2 and Tables 2-3 suggests 
that E Z and E' behave as it would be expected according to the simple model 
(I )-(7). In particular, the response of all three variables to an innovation 
in E Z suggests that it can be interpreted as a productivity or supply shock. A 
positive productivity shock has a strong but short-lived etTect on unemployment, 
which might be caused by a slow process of labour reallocation. This shock hardly 
contributes to the forecast variance decomposition of inflation at any time horizon. 
Notwithstanding, the contribution of such a supply shock to explain the unit root of 
output is slightly low as compared with the contribution of E'. 
The monetary root of inflation can only be in either EN or E·, but not in 
both since these shocks are, by construction, orthogona1. There are several reasons 
to argue that the monetary component of inflation has to be in EN, whereas E· is 
a non-nominal source of permanent inflation. First, the forecast variance 
decomposition of the model indicates that E' explains most of the short and long­
run path of unemployment and a great deal of those of output too, which is not what 
could be expected from a nominal shock. Second, in most countries EN might be 
characterized as a nominal demand shock. It is demand since the short run 
correlation with unemployment displays a Phillips curve pattern: the increase in 
inflation leads to a rapid fall in unemployment in the short run. As inflation reaches 
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its steady-state level, unemployment subsides slowly returning to its previous level. 
On the other hand, eN must be nominal since it accounts for most of the variance 
of the forecast error of inflation over the long run, whereas its contribution to the 
forecast variance decomposition of output and unemployment is virtually nil (Tables 
2 and 3). These results are consistent with the widespread consensus among 
economists that the long run behaviour of real variables is basically driven by real 
shocks. 
As regards the long-11m elasticity of output with respect to nominal 
innovations, it is negative in six out of the nine cases. Actually, a pennanent increase 
in inflation due to a nominal shock has a positive effect on output in France and 
Italy and negative in Japan, Spain, United States, Australia, The United Kingdom and 
Canada (although in the later the effect is just weakly significant)'I8). This effect 
is non significant in the case of Gennany. Finally, when the sample period is 
resnicted to 1974:2-1996:3, 1976:3-1996:3 and 1980:1-1996:3 the negative response 
to innovations in EN becomes stronger and more significant in all cases. This is the 
main hypothesis we are interested in. This means that disinflations achieved through 
a permanent fall in monetary growth might have significant short run unemployment 
costs, but end up having net beneficial permanent effects on output. Figures 3.1, 3.2 
and 3.3 also show that, for some counnies, the path of output following a change 
in EN is consistent with the central banker's view of disinflations: the main cost of 
disinflation comes first, in tenns of higher unemployment and lower output; in the 
medium and longer tenn, unemployment gets back to its unchanged natural rate and 
output increases to achieve its new long run level. Again, these results are consistent 
with the dynamics of the simple model sketched in the previous section. If the 
shock eN is predominantly associated with permanent changes in the rate of growth 
of money, and since its long-run effect on unemployment is restricted to zero, the 
only way in which it can exert a permanent effect upon output is through its 
incidence on the accumulation of productive factors and/or on the level of total 
(lg) When the model includes a time trend, results are very similar, but the 
negative effect of nominal shocks in Canada becomes strongly significant. 
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factor productivity. This is precisely what the literature on inflation and growth is 
about and Qur results confirm that the negative correlation among inflation and 
output found in some of these studies cannot be explained solely on the basis of 
endogeneity(19). 
France and Italy are the only countries in the sample whose behaviour is at 
odds with these negative long-run elasticity results. A closer inspection of these cases 
reveals that perhaps the nominal component of inflation is not well identified in 
these two countries under neither scheme. First, notice that in these two cases the 
short-run response of unemployment and output to eN does not exhibit the Phil/ips 
cUlve pattern common to all other countries. Also, whereas the average contribution 
of e' to the long-run forecast error variance of inflation, excluding France and Italy, 
ranges from 12 to 22 per cent, this value reaches a low 5 per cent in France and a 
high 34 per cent in Italy. This makes, for our purposes, the identification of the 
nominal shock in these two counmes slightly less reliable than in the rest of the 
countries. In France the identification is not satisfactory since the nominal shock 
explains a large proportion of the output variance (9%), far larger than in other 
counmes (excluding Italy). On the other hand, this is the only country for which 
inflation is almost fully explained by e N, so it is not surprising that the results are 
close to those obtained under the extreme monetahst identification(20), But that 
scheme has the unpleasant feature that the nominal shock explains a great proportion 
of the forecast error variance of output (up to 1 0  per cent 1 0  years ahead). The 
identified eN shock also explains an extremely high proportion of long-run output 
in Italy: 30 percent. In this country, inflation is also explained almost in similar 
proportions by eN and e', whereas the later shock explains almost nothing of 
output in the long run. 
(19) Since output is stationary in first differences in our sample. the effect of 
inflation is an effect upon the steady state level of output. This is consistent with the 
findings in the literature on growth empirics. See Andres and Hernando ( 1 997) for 
a detailed discussion on this issue. 
(2" The p-value of the overidentif)dng resmctions is close to the level of non 
rejection (Table 1). 
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Finally, a common feature of the results obtained is the shape of the response 
of both inflation and output to innovations in e· I the other source of long-run 
inflation dynamics. A negative innovation in €. generates a pennanent fall in 
inflation associated with a pennanent fall in output. This confirms our previous 
sunnise of a misspecification bias in the extreme monetarist identifying scheme(21). 
The long-run response of output, unemployment and inflation to innovations 
in e' also permits to draw some additional policy implications of the model. The 
main purpose of the paper was to investigate the long-run implications of those 
monetary policies aimed at achieving a permanent disinflation. But the unit root of 
inflation has also a non negligible real component. Our results show that the way 
disinflation is pursued matters. In particular, when the disinflation is achieved by 
means of changes in e·, the short-run unemployment and output costs extend over 
the long run generating a pennanent cost. In this case the unemployment effects of 
disinflation are long-lasting and outweigh the efficiency gains leading to a 
permanently lower steady state output. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have analyzed the dynamic response of unemployment and 
output following a monetary policy shock aimed at reducing the steady state level 
of inflation. We focus in the recent disinflation experience witnessed in several of 
the most advanced economies in the world. For that purpose, we estimate a V AR 
model on these three variables and chose to identify the shocks on the basis of their 
long-run expected impact, as suggested by a broad class of macroeconomic models. 
Two identification restrictions tum out to be of crucial importance: the first one. is 
the extreme monetarist claim that inflation is just a monetary phenomenon in the 
long-run; the second one is common to most theories of the business cycle and 
91) If our scheme is correct the nominal shock estimated under the monetarist 
scheme is a composite of eN and E. Even if the contribution of" to inflation is 
small, a powerful long-run positive impact of" on output generates the positive 
impulse response estimated under that scheme. 
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simply argues that monetOlY shocks do not generate a long-run trade-off between 
inflation and unemploymenl.The firslresult of our exercise is that these theoretically 
appealing restrictions are clearly at odds with the recent experience in the countries 
in our sample. This is not surprising because one can hardly expect the existing long­
run non-zero correlation between inflation and unemploymen.t being explained by 
models in which the sources of the unit roots behind these series are orthogonal. 
In order to reconcile the model with the facts either of these assumptions has 
to be removed. The model under the extreme monelarLvt restriction might be 
inadequate for our purposes, since it puts too much structure on the process driving 
inflation. The risk of the nominal shock identified under this assumption being 
contaminated by a, small but non-negligible, real component is simple too big. We 
choose to stick to the predictions of business cycle theory and allow for more than 
one source of long-run inflation while imposing that money does not exert a 
permanent influence upon the natural rate. This implies that unit roots of inflation 
and unemployment have something in common which is real instead of nominal. Our 
second result is that the dynamic relationship among nominal shocks, output and 
unemployment, estimated under this scheme, very much confirms the widespread 
view of the disinflation literature: a process of pennanent disinflation, engineered by 
the monetary authority, might lead to a temporary increase in unemployment (along 
a short-run Phillips curve trade�fl); once unemployment is back to its natural rate, 
the economy reaches a new long run equilibrium with both higher productivity and 
output. 
The third result is that whereas nominal disinflations lead to long run output 
gains, disinflations achieved by other (real) means might impinge upon the economy 
not only a temporary but also a permanent cost. The cause is that although both 
disinflation strategies do rise productivity, the rise in unemployment associated to the 
a 'real' disinflation leads to a net output loss. This last component is what extreme 
monetarist identification scheme fails to pick up properly, thus misrepresenting the 
long-run effect of monetary policies. 
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A proper evaluation of the costs and benefits of disinflation requires an 
explicit loss function for the monetary authority. Since the output gain of monetary 
disinflations is permanent, its present value outweighs that of the increased 
unemployment at a zero discount rate. If the central bank has both unemployment 
(probably approximating distributional issues) and output among the arguments of 
its objective function, the present value of a disinflation will depend on the discount 
rate. 
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APPENDIX t: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF THE VARIABLES 
Variables Definition: OECD DATA. Output (Y) defined as GOP expressed in 1986 
prices and GOP implicit price deflator (P) are ITom Quarterly National Accounts. 
Annual inflation rate is defined as ",�d. log P,. Unemployment (u) is defined as the 
total unemployment rate. Investment (I) is defined as Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
at 1990 prices. We estimate all the VAR models including four lags, a constant term 
and seasonal dummies. The results are extremely robust to use inflation defined as 
CPI annual rate. The sample period covers from 1 972:2 to 1 996:3 excepts for Italy 
( 1 972:2-1 995:3), Spain ( 1976:3-1996:3) and Germany ( 1972:2-1 994:4). On the 
grounds of homogeneous data availability we use data of West Germany instead of 
Germany. 
UNIT ROOT TESTS 
OUTPUT INFLATION 
OF PP OF PP 
AUSTRALIA 0.90 1 .49 -1.63 -1.42 
CANADA -0.73 -0.84 -1.07 - 1 . 1 1 
SPAIN -0. 12 0.71 -2.85 -2.52 
FRANCE -0.16 -0.28 -0.91 -0.92 
ITALY -0.69 -0.54 -0.84 - 1 .47 
JAPAN -0.61 0.32 -4.79 - 1 .88 
UK -0.07 0.63 -1.37 - 1 .67 
USA -0.09 0.46 - 1 .95 -1.64 
GERMANY 0.37 0.44 -1 .70 -1.22 
Nota: OF: T -statistics Dickey-Fuller tests, and PP: T -statistics Phillips-
Perron tests. 
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UNIT ROOT TESTS 
INVESTMENT UNEMPLOYMENT 
DF PP DF PP 
AUSTRALIA 1.00 1.50 -2.30 -2.36 
CANADA 1 .88 1.99 -2.50 -2.18 
SPAIN 0.64 1.34 -2.80 -2.40 
FRANCE 0.72 1.28 - 1 .24 -1.25 
ITALY 0.65 0.80 -1.20 -0.54 
JAPAN 2.72 3.44 -1.83 -1.45 
UK 0.67 1.20 -2.50 -2.02 
USA 1 .64 2.55 -2.46 -2.38 
GERMANY 0.38 0.43 -2. 15  1 . 1 1 
Nota: DF: T-statistics Dickey-Fuller tests, and PP: T -statistics Phillips-
Perron tests. 
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APPENDIX 2: A STYLIZED MODEL OF THE LABOR MARKET 
Let us consider the following simple version of the insiders-outsiders model 
of the labour market. The expressions for the supply (n') and demand (n') for labour 
are: 
( 2 . 1) 
( 2 . 2) 
where all g's are positive, wop and a represent the real wage and total factor 
productivity. Workers set the nominal wage before the realization of current variables 
is known, as to achieve the highest real wage compatible with a given employment 
target (nl): 
W I  , 
Thus, the unemployment rate behaves according to: 
Let us assume the following general expression for n': 
( 2 . 3) 
( 2 .4)  
( 2 . 5) 
The employment target of the insiders is a weighted average of the current labour 
supply and past employment. Also this employment target is lower the higher the 
distortions induced by some labour market institutions captured by Z (unemployment 
benefit duration, minimum wages, etc.). The parameter y (which lies between 0 and 
/) captures the power of insiders (employment protection legislation, hiring and 
firing costs and the like), such that the higher that power the higher y. Thus, the 
Phillips curve can be written (adding and subtracting P,.I) as: 
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(2 . 6) 
Notice that when y is strictly lower than J the unit root of unemployment is 
purely real and should be explained by the presence of non stationary components 
in Z. 
When y is equal to 1, the nominal surprise enters In the unit root of 
unemployment (along with other real components): 
(2 . 6 '  ) 
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APPENDIX 3: ALTERNATIVE IDENTIFICATION SCHEMES 
It might be argued that the unit root of unemployment is a sampling feature 
and that therefore it cannot be used to draw inferences about the long run path of the 
economy. If unemployment cannot be brought into our VAR model, the only way 
in which the extreme monetarisl assumption can be relaxed is by invoking 
restrictions in the short run coefficients ciO). This is most clear if we consider the 
bivariate model in inflation and output, driven by two shocks (nominal and real). If 
real shocks are allowed to have a long-run effect on inflation, the only way in which 
the output effect of nominal shocks can be tested is by imposing restrictions in the 
short run dynamics. This is also b'Ue even if a third variable, other than the 
unemployment rate, is used to enlarge the model unless some theoretical restriction 
can be imposed on the long-run determinants of such variable. 
In this section the long-run effect of monetary policies is estimated in three 
different models, all of them identified resorting to one or more restrictions on the 
matrix of contemporaneous coefficients. Since models identified under short-run 
restrictions are somewhat less reliable, we have chosen to present several alternatives 
to asses the robustness of the results. The first model substitutes unemployment by 
the log of investment (i) into the V AR and is estimated under the restrictions: 
c,,(I) =c,,(O)=c,,(O)=O: 
Cll (L) C'2 (L) c13 (L) 
C21 (L) c" (L) c" (L) 
en (L) c" (L) c" (L) 
( 3 _ 1 )  
One of the channels through which inflation is meant to affect output in 
market economies is by reducing the saving and accumulation effort. Then 
investment is a natural candidate to assess the long-run effect of disinflations. 
Investment is non-stationary but, unfortunately, there are no plausible theoretical 
restrictions to impose on its long-run determinants. Thus the model can only be 
identified invoking two additional short run restrictions (over and above c,,(I)=O 
which implies that we only try to isolate two sources of long-run inflation). Among 
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these we chose to impose that the nominal shock has no current effect on output and 
investment. 
The second model is a VAR in output and inflation in which nominal shocks 
are assumed not to have current impact on output: c,iO) =0. 
[a,,] 
= 
[Cll (L) c12 (L) ] [£1 
ay C21 (L) c" (L) £zJ 
(3 . 2 )  
The third model simply substitutes output by investment i n  the previous one: 
[a,,] 
= 
[Cll (L) C1, (L) ] [£1 
ai c21 (L) c,, (L) eiJ 
(3 . 3 )  
The rationale of these short-run restrictions is weaker than that of the long­
run ones. Admittedly, nominal shocks might have an immediate impact on real 
variables invalidating the restrictions imposed on c,,(O) and c,iO). Nonetheless, these 
restrictions simply set the contemporaneous response of real variables to nominal 
shocks to zero. This is most natural since the longwrun effect of money on output that 
we are nying to identify operates through the response of potential output nor 
through the output gap. The response of potential output is expected to be slow 
requiring some time lag to show up. 
The results obtained in all three models are very robust. In all cases, the 
nominal shock is well identified according to the estimated forecast error variance 
decompositions (Tables AJ-I to AJ-3) as well as the impulse-response functions 
(Figures AJ-I to A3_3)ml The variance decompositions show that the shock e" 
explains most of inflation fluctuations, and very little of output ones. As regards the 
long-run effect of these shocks, the impulse-response functions depicted in Figures 
A3-1 to A3-3 share a conunon pattern: the response of investment and output to 
nominal shocks is always negative and significant for an 9 countries in the 
sample(23). 
Ill) The real sources of fluctuations are not well disentangled in model (3. I). 
,," The only exception is the response of investment to nominal shocks in 
Canada (models (3.1) and (3.3)). 
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TABLE 1: Test of the Overidentifying restriction 
Chi-Squared( 1 DF) Significance Level 
USA 14.87 0.000 
CANADA 15.21 0.000 
JAPAN 23.04 0.000 
UNITED KINGDOM 20.88 0.000 
FRANCE 4.77 0.029 
GERMANY 26.61 0.000 
ITALY 34.62 0.000 
AUSTRALIA 12.13 0.000 
SPAIN 23.67 0.000 
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TABLE 2. One-Year Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
. 
EN EZ E 
USA Unemployment 90(2) 6(2) 4(1) 
Inflation 2(1 ) 98(1 ) 0(0) 
Output 86(3) 4(1) 10(2) 
CANADA Unemployment 94(1 ) 3(1) 3(1) 
Inflation 2(3) 96(3) 2(1) 
Output 62(7) 1(2) 37(7) 
JAPAN Unemployment 76(4) 5(1) 19(3) 
Inflation 17(13) 71(1 1 ) 12(3) 
Output 69(9) 1(1) 30(8) 
UNITED KINGDOM Unemployment 90(2) 9(2) 1(0) 
Inflation 21(9) 78(9) 1(0) 
Output 63(8) 1(1 ) 36(5) 
FRANCE Unemployment 85(3) 0(0) 14(3) 
Inflation 2(3) 95(3) 3(1 ) 
Output 57(8) 13(5) 30(7) 
GERMANY Unemployment 94(1) 5(1) 1(0) 
Inflation 9(6) 90(6) 1(0) 
Output 68(7) 8(3) 24(5) 
ITALY Unemployment 91(2) 6(1) 4(1) 
Inflation 22(8) 55(7) 23(5) 
Output 17(9) 34(9) 49(9) 
AUSTRALIA Unemployment 93(1) 1(0) 5(1) 
Inflation 1(2) 97(2) 1(0) 
Output 75(5) 1(1 ) 24(5) 
SPAIN Unemployment 81(4) 2(1 ) 17(3) 
Inflation 2(5) 97(5) 1(0) 
Output 82(5) 1(2) 17(4) 
NOTE: Standard Errors in brackets. 
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TABLE 3. Long-Run (Ten Years) Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
. eN eZ e 
USA Unemployment 99(0) 1(0) 0(0) 
Inflation 14(7) 86(7) 0(0) 
Output 83(3) I (I) 16(3) 
CANADA Unemployment 99(0) 0(0) 0(0) 
Inflation IS(7) 84(7) 1 (0) 
Output 31 (8) \(1 ) 68(8) 
JAPAN Unemployment 99(0) 0(0) \(0) 
Inflation 20(6) 78(6) 2(0) 
Output 80(8) 2(1) \8(7) 
UNITED KINGDOM Unemployment 100(0) 0(0) 0(0) 
Inflation 2\(8) 79(8) 0(0) 
Output 77(S) 2(1) 21(S) 
FRANCE Unemployment 99(0) 0(0) 1 (0) 
Inflation S(4) 94(4) 0(0) 
Output S I(9) 9(4) 40(9) 
GERMANY Unemployment 100(0) 0(0) 0(0) 
Inflation 23(7) 77(7) 0(0) 
Output 90(2) 1(0) 9(2) 
ITALY Unemployment 99(0) 1(0) 0(0) 
Inflation 34(10) 62(9) 4(1) 
Ou!eut 3(3) 30(10) 67(9) 
AUSTRALIA Unemployment 99(0) 0(0) 0(0) 
Inflation 12(7) 87(7) 0(0) 
Output 64(7) 2(2) 34(7) 
SPAIN Unemployment 100(0) 0(0) 0(0) 
Inflation 22(9) 77(9) 0(0) 
Output 90(3) 1(\ ) 9(2) 
NOTE: Standard Errors in brackets. 
- 39 -
TABLE A3-1. Long-Run Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (model (3.1» 
. 
EN EZ E 
USA Inflation 48(9) 0(10) 52(13) 
Output 22(4) 7(21) 7 1(20) 
Investment 37(16) 5(16) 58(16) 
UK Inflation 92(6) 1(3) 7(6) 
Output 12(3) 17(32) 71  (3 1) 
Investment 5(1) 0(31) 95(31) 
FRANCE Inflation 66(9) 0(6) 33(1 1 ) 
Output 6(2) 25(27) 69(27) 
Investment 8(2) 1(20) 9 1 (20) 
CANADA Inflation 77(10) 1(5) 22(1 1 ) 
Output 4(1) 80(27) 16(27) 
Investment 1(0) 7(30) 92(30) 
ITALY Inflation 42(8) 1 (6) 57(10) 
Output 7(2) 4(16) 89(16) 
Investment 2(1 ) 57(26) 41 (26) 
JAPAN Inflation 53(8) 3(6) 44(10) 
Output 6(2) 69(27) 25(26) 
Investment 5(1) 16(21) 80(21) 
AUSTRALIA Inflation 90(7) 0(3) 10(7) 
Output 4(1) 54(32) 42(32) 
Investment 7(2) 6(32) 87(31) 
SPAIN Inflation 8 1(4) 1 (6) 1 8( 10) 
Output 1(0) 48(35) 5 1(35) 
Investment 2( 1) 1 8(35) 80(35) 
GERMANY Inflation 86(7) 0(4) 14(8) 
Output 5(1) 2(27) 93(28) 
Investment 3(1) 10(29) 87(29) 
NOTE: Standard Errors in brackets. 
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TABLE A3-2. Long-Run Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (model (3.2)) 
8' 8T 
USA Inflation 52(9) 48(9) 
Output 23(5) 77(5) 
UK Inflation 96(4) 4(4) 
Output 9(2) 9 1 (2) 
CANADA Inflation 86(7) 14(7) 
Output 2(1 ) 98(\) 
FRANCE Inflation 82(7) 1 8(7) 
Output 3(1 ) 97(1 ) 
ITALY Inflation 48(8) 52(8) 
Output 6(1) 94(\) 
JAPAN Inflation 80(7) 20(7) 
Output 7(2) 93(2) 
AUSTRALIA Inflation 93(5) 7(5) 
Output 8(3) 92(3) 
GERMANY Inflation 89(6) 1 1 (6) 
Output 4(1� 96(1) 
SPAIN Inflation 86(10) 14(10) 
Output 0(0) 100(0) 
NOTE: Standard Errors in brackets. 
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TABLE A3-3. Long-Run Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (model (3.3» 
eP eT 
USA Inflation 45(10) 55(10) 
Investment 38(6) 62(6) 
UK Inflation 90(5) 10(5) 
Investment 7(3) 93(3) 
CANADA Inflation 79(7) 2 1(7) 
Investment 2(0) 98(0) 
FRANCE Inflation 66(9) 34(9) 
Investment 9(2) 91(2) 
ITALY Inflation 64(7) 36(7) 
Investment 2(0) 98(0) 
JAPAN Inflation 62( 1 1 ) 38( 1 1 ) 
Investment 8(2) 92(2) 
AUSTRALIA Inflation 90(7) 10(7) 
Investment 6(2) 94(2) 
GERMANY Inflation 87(8) 13(8) 
Investment 5(1) 95( 1) 
SPAIN Inflation 8 1 (9) 19(9) 
Investment 2(0) 98(0) 
NOTE: Standard ErroTS in brackets. 
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